“There is only five and a half kilometres from Akkarayankulam north to Kilinochchi town and two and half kilometres to the A 9 road.” said Sri Lanka Army Commander Lt Gen Sarath Fonseka
A team of the Special Forces that crept through a gap in the LTTE defence line east of Akkarayankulam, engaged in a fierce fight with five LTTE teams from the Charles Anthony and Imran Pandian units’ yesterday morning, killing 60 Tigers. Two Special Forces personnel were killed and six soldiers too killed in the fight, and 20 others received injuries, said a senior officer from the battle front.
The Special Forces and the 572 Brigade commanded by Colonel Senarath Bandara are engaged in heavy fighting in Akkarayankulam on the outskirts of Kilinochchi, while the LTTE has launched counter attacks to repulse the Army offensive. But SLA infantry continued its offensive backed by artillery and MBRLs. MBRL and artillery fire were directed at the Tigers for almost five hours. Meanwhile Sri Lanka Air Force Mi 24 helicopter gunships attacked Tiger reinforcement cadres.
The LTTE has mobilised all its resources to defend Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu. There are reports from Mankulam that LTTE cadres have been evacuated from Mankulam, and there is only a small number left there.
Cadres from Mankulam are said to be allocated to the Kilinochchi front. The LTTE has shifted its military assets to Mullaitivu, and the LTTE leadership had reportedly given instruction to ground leaders to repulse the SL Army offensive at any cost, which the Army is well aware of.
This battle continues with the LTTE firing artillery and 81 mm mortars, with the Army retaliating.
The small groups of the 57th Division had done a tremendous amount of work to achieve their objectives. They are committed to the battle front in Akkarayankulam and Vannerikulam.
Fighting was also reported in Vannerikulam North, Akkarayankulam, Pannei Kandamadu and Vannikulam, when LTTE fighters have resisted limited attacks by the SLA’s 58th Division. More fighting was reported in Andankulam in Mullaitivu district where the 59th Division has been conducting operations.
The SF team engaged in today’s battle was from the 1st Special Forces. Special Forces deployment was increased in the area following LTTE counter attacks in Akkarayan. The decision was made at a meeting between Army Commander Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka, Maj. Gen. Jagath Jayasuriya, Security Forces Commander Vavuniya Maj. Gen. Jagath Dias (GoC 57), SF Brigade Commander Brigadier Nirmal Dharmaratne and Brigadier Shavendra Silva (GoC TF-1).
At the time of writing this column, the Army and LTTE are engaging in fierce battle in Akkarayankulam.
Meanwhile Tigers have started digging a trench parallel to the A-9 from Kilinochchi to Iranamadu via Kokavil, using forced civilian labour and heavy equipment captured from/surrendered by NGOs. Some of this equipment was destroyed in an air strike yesterday.
Air targets cause severe damage
The Sri Lanka Air Force supersonic fighter jets carried out two successive raids targeting two separate high profile LTTE targets in Mullaitivu and Kilinochchi districts last morning.
On 16th SLAF jets raided an LTTE high-tech facility located five km north-east of Puthukkudiyirippu area in the Mullaitivu district around 6.40 a.m. The Air Force had reportedly received intelligence from the ground as well as from Air Force air reconnaissance.
The SLAF had targeted an LTTE high-tech base reportedly equipped with computers, satellite uplink terminals and international data and containing its bank accounts, international communication facilities and other sophisticated equipment, solely for military purposes run by a high profile LTTE leader who has sound technical capability. This base is in charge of LTTE leader Prabhakaran’s son Charles Anthony and ‘Castro’ a leader who handles the LTTE international network.
Meanwhile, SLAF jets carried out another raid targeting an LTTE logistics and transit facility located three km. north-east of Udayarkattukulam in Kilinochchi district around 6.30 last morning, the spokesperson said. According to the information received from the Wanni, several arms and ammunition manufacturing yards of the LTTE were functioning in this area.
Air and ground intelligence have confirmed the targets were accurately taken and damaged and heavy losses caused to the LTTE.
Second runway expanded
Meanwhile, the LTTE has built its second runway at Mulliyawalai in Mullaitivu district, although the SL Air Force bombed and damaged the runway. The LTTE reconstructed the runway which is said to be bigger than the Iranamadu runway. One intelligence officer had confirmed that even large aircraft can landed on this runway. What is the intention of the LTTE in building such a big runway? Are the Tigers hoping to hijack a commercial aircraft and land it there? Otherwise, why do they need this large runway?
Army cuts off supply route
The capture and destabilisation of the Iranamadu area will sever the main artery of the LTTE, the A9 road, thus creating a logistical nightmare for the LTTE. With this main artery severed, the movement of LTTE cadres and dispatch of war material from Kilinochchi to the Vavuniya sector will be arduous. With the monsoon season approaching, the loss of Iranamadu would mean that the Tigers would need to use jungle routes to supply their forces in Vavuniya. This will not be a simple task. The LTTE seems to have anticipated an SLA move eastwards in the direction of Iranamadu. Thus the battle for Kilinochchi begins and the LTTE will be forced to respond and commit cadres to the battle or risk losing its ‘administrative capital’ without denting the SLA offensives.
The 58th Division is in control of the Wanni’s western coastline in Mannar District up to Nachchikudah, effectively crippling even minor arms shipments into rebel territory. The LTTE is gambling on the fact that it can reverse its losses in the Wanni campaign, with the supplies currently stockpiled. This has given the Tigers the benefit of not having to stand and fight when they don’t want to, but the cost of failure will be catastrophic to the separatist cause.
Even if the LTTE does have the military capacity to eventually turn the tide of this war back in its favour, and recapture lost territory, it risks losing everything on the eve of a victory when it runs out of critical supplies.
In short, it risks an El Alamein-type loss.
In World War Two, Field Marshal Erwin Rommel led Germany’s Afrika Korps to the verge of victory, only to be utterly defeated due to critical supply shortages. Despite winning a string of victories from Libya to Egypt, that gave him control of most of North Africa, Rommel was fighting a campaign in which he was technically the underdog. It certainly didn’t look like that at the time, but the Commonwealth Forces enjoyed far greater numbers, more supplies, and had shorter and shorter supply lines throughout Rommel’s advance, while the opposite was true for the Germans. In addition, the Germans had no real means of cutting the Allied supply lines, while the German lines were facing constant harassment from the air and the sea.
At the first and second battles of El-Alamein, this supply shortfall first prevented Rommel from breaking the back of the Allies and capturing the Nile, and later allowed the Allies to totally break his army in a counter-attack the Germans didn’t have the capacity to resist.
In the Wanni, the situation is somewhat different, but does bear a striking similarity to the German highwater mark in the North Africa Campaign. If the LTTE does launch a do or die counter offensive before the end, its strategy and objectives will be along the same lines as Rommel’s were at El Alamein, and it will face an almost identical supply crisis. The Tigers will seek to capture strategic coastal territory and large population centres in Mannar and Kilinochchi districts, inflict heavy casualties on the Sri Lankan Army, and capture large quantities of supplies from Sri Lankan troops. The price of failure is likewise similar. If they don’t achieve every one of these objectives, they will likely collapse as a conventional fighting force very quickly after their offensive is defeated or runs out of steam.
The LTTE leader Prabhakaran’s gamble, like Rommel’s, is a race against time to win a decisive victory before supply shortages and casualties not only force the Tigers to abandon their offensive, but make further conventional resistance impossible.
The LTTE is being compressed like a spring. It is the hope of the Tigers that when the time is right, they will rapidly expand and push back the Sri Lankan forces, achieving a crushing victory. To ensure the maximum probability of success, the LTTE has taken special care to how its cadres retreat. Several factors can turn a retreat from a sign of defeat into a strategy for victory. Rommel recognised these factors and was able to take advantage of them to benefit his soldiers even after conquering North Africa was no longer possible. After his defeat at El Alamein, Rommel’s objectives changed from defeating the enemy, to ensuring the maximum number of troops as possible escape to Europe. Despite the impending fall of North Africa, he was able to save a large portion of the Afrika Korps by organising a disciplined retreat. This was Germany’s silver lining in an otherwise total defeat.
While the LTTE has been falling back ahead of a major offensive instead of at the end of one, the Tigers too have led an orderly retreat. They have retained unit cohesion for the most part, ensuring that their veteran units will be available for a future offensive. They have also kept the Sri Lankan Army at bay, engaging in minor skirmishes and planting mines, just like Rommel did on the march back to Tunisia. They have even been able to boost the morale of their cadres, despite the constant advance of the Sri Lankan Army, with high profile raids that usually have little or no strategic implications. The LTTE’s air wing, for example, has become a source of pride for the rebels, despite having almost nothing to show for its efforts.
Meanwhile, there is one thing the LTTE has achieved that Rommel was unable to do. The LTTE has retained most of its heavy weapons, despite losing huge swaths of territory. This will greatly benefit any committed offensive or defensive operation by giving the LTTE ground cadres fire support that has already proven very effective in past operations. But the Army’s objective is to capture heavy weapons the way it captured artillery guns in Vakarai, at the same time use the Air Force to destroy LTTE artillery guns from the air
If and when the LTTE launches its major assault, the big guns that have been captured mostly from Sri Lankan Forces in the past, will be used much like the recent combined assault on a Sri Lankan radar array. There, Black Tigers, LTTE regulars, artillery support, and the Air Tigers were deployed in the hopes of blinding the Sri Lankan air defence network. Superior judgment by Sri Lankan troops on the frontline, ensured that this operation was a failure and the destruction of a rebel bomber made this attack a costly mistake for the LTTE. However, its ability to combine infantry, suicide commandos, artillery, and air power for a single operation, gives us a taste of what the LTTE offensive will look like. It will be a coordinated effort by multiple combat elements to strike well defined targets with casualties on both sides, at least initially, fairly evenly balanced, if not in the LTTE’s favour.
Turning the tide
Despite this success in preserving its forces for a major battle, the Tigers hope they will be able to turn the tide of war. The LTTE is facing a worst-case scenario. With supply lines largely eliminated or constricted, the Tigers have only a short time to plan, launch, and win a major offensive before supply shortfalls cripple their ability to wage war. This offensive must result in the capture of large quantities of supplies and have a favourable casualty ratio to make any gains sustainable. The LTTE requires a flawlessly executed battle plan that may very well be the largest of the war and if it is not achieved, the Tigers will face extinction.
Heavy fire power
The Sri Lankan Armed Forces have never been stronger. In the air, the Air Force has a large number of planes and helicopters to provide air support to soldiers on the ground. On the ground, tens of thousands of Sri Lankan troops are deployed in front line positions, and tens of thousands more wait in reserve to contain any LTTE breakout attempt. New Multi-Barrel Rocket Launchers MBRL(40 rockets with in 20 seconds can fire from MBRL lethal Zone is 600x400 meters) allow Sri Lankan artillery units to sterilise large areas of the combat zone with a rain of missiles that the LTTE have never successfully countered. Sri Lankan troops also enjoy secure supply lines and do not have to count on captured war materials to continue fighting.
Despite their success in preserving key military units and heavy weapons, the deck is certainly stacked against the LTTE. While the Tigers field a capable, versatile, and innovative army, they are attempting to defeat an opponent that is well led, has superior numbers, superior technology, and superior supply lines. While they can certainly promise Sri Lanka a bloody battle, the odds of a major Sri Lankan defeat are shrinking with each passing day.
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