By Sudha Ramachandran
BANGALORE - Even as Sri Lankan armed forces gain ground in their military operations against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in northern Sri Lanka, the LTTE has signaled yet again its capacity to rain destruction from the skies.
On the night of August 26, two LTTE light aircraft sneaked into airspace over a tightly secured key naval base in the eastern port city of Trincomalee and dropped two bombs.
Four days later, the LTTE stuck again, this time in the heart of the capital, Colombo. A parcel bomb went off in Pettah, a crowded commercial area near the bus station and railway terminus, injuring about 50 people.
While the air strikes on the Eastern Naval Command headquarters signal the LTTE's continuing capability to breach air space of even high security zones, the blast in Colombo indicates that it can carry out attacks in "tightly secure" Colombo.
Last month, Colombo played host to the 15th summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. The summit took place under unprecedented levels of security in Colombo. Two Indian warships, INS Ranvir and INS Mysore, were docked off the Colombo coast to deal with any contingency.
The air strike on Trincomalee has been described by the Sri Lankan military as an "abortive raid". Indeed, the LTTE aircraft had to pull away under fire from anti-aircraft guns. And the airstrike did not damage the Eastern Naval Headquarters at Trincomalee and only one of the two bombs dropped went off.
"Still, the mission was partially successful. At least 10 sailors were injured in the strike. What is more, the aircraft successfully dodged anti-aircraft gunfire," a Tamil journalist based in Colombo told Asia Times Online.
This is the sixth aerial attack by the LTTE's air wing. On March 26, 2007, the LTTE carried out its first air strike, dropping bombs on the Katunayake military air base near Colombo international airport. While that strike failed to destroy any of the Sri Lanka Air Force's MiG-27 and Kfir fighter jets lined up at the base, it announced the LTTE's arrival as the world's only insurgent group with air capability. The attack also sent out an audacious message: the Sri Lankan government had lost its monopoly over the country's air space.
Less than a month later, a Tiger aircraft headed towards Palaly air base in Jaffna. While anti-aircraft fire prevented an assault on Palaly, the LTTE was able to hit nearby military bunker. Three days later, the LTTE air wing struck again, this time dropping bombs on oil storage facilities near Colombo. Then in October, LTTE aircraft targeted a key air base at Anuradhapura, 212 kilometers north of Colombo. The air strikes were part of a combined land-air operation on the Anuradhapura base. In April, LTTE aircraft dropped three bombs on military installations near the army's forward defense lines in Weli Oya.
The Tamil Eelam Air Force, as the LTTE's air wing is called, includes just a few light aircraft. It is nothing compared to the Sri Lankan Air Force. Still, it cannot be dismissed as inconsequential. It has survived the air force's repeated bombing raids on its air infrastructure at Iranamadu in northern Sri Lanka and has repeatedly breached air defenses, even in high-security zones. And its aircraft have escaped unscathed from anti-aircraft fire during all raids so far.
The air strikes will boost the sagging morale of LTTE cadres, but it will not correct the current tilt in favor of the military in the ongoing war in the island.
The LTTE has suffered a series of reverses on the battlefield over the past year. In July 2007, the last of its strongholds in the multi-ethnic Eastern Province fell to government forces. Recently, the government consolidated political control over the east through holding elections there. In the year since, government troops have advanced into LTTE-controlled territory. The Lankan military claims it is around 12km from Kilinochchi town, where the LTTE's political headquarters is based. The LTTE has lost several top leaders and hundreds of cadres over the past year. Over the past month, a string of towns and LTTE bases in the north have fallen into government hands.
Battles between the Sri Lankan armed forces and the LTTE are bound to become bloodier as soldiers close in on Kilinochchi town. The government has called on civilians in Kilinochchi to leave their homes and flee to government-held territory.
Even as the Sri Lankan armed forces step up their battle against the LTTE, they are having to grapple with large-scale desertions. The government had announced an amnesty to deserters this year, in a bid to draw soldiers back into the forces. Over 1,700 deserters returned while 1,600 were arrested, army spokesperson Udaya Nanayakkara said last month. The amnesty was withdrawn last month, which means that about 12,000 soldiers and officers will face punitive action.
"The 160,000-strong Sri Lankan armed forces will need every one of their soldiers for the upcoming battle for Kilinochchi, where the LTTE is expected to send its cadres in unceasing waves to defend the stronghold," the Tamil journalist said.
"Much will depend on how India reacts to the high civilian casualties that are inevitable in the event of the army laying siege to the LTTE's political headquarters," he said.
Some believe that India might pressure the Lankan government to back off.
Recently, when India's National Security Advisor M K Narayanan observed in an interview with the Straits Times of Singapore that even if the government wins the battle for Kilinochchi, it will not win the war unless a viable political solution that will win over the Tamil people is put in place, it created a bit of a flutter in Colombo.
It prompted a section of Sri Lankans to recall events in the summer of 1987. An article by Dharisha Bastians in The Nation, an English weekly, recalled that in 1987, when the Sri Lankan armed forces were rapidly advancing in the Vadamrachchi sector of the Jaffna Peninsula and had the LTTE "on the run", India air-dropped food rations over the peninsula for the beleaguered Tamil population. The Sri Lankan government subsequently halted its military operations and came around to signing an agreement with India that aimed at a political settlement of the conflict.
"With the infamous 1987 parippu [lentil] drop still fresh in their minds, Sri Lankans continue to be wary of the levels of Indian involvement in the Lankan conflict," Bastians observes.
Sri Lankan hardliners, who believe that a military solution to the conflict is possible, resent India's calls for a political settlement. Delhi believes that only a negotiated political settlement will resolve the problem. Its appeals to Colombo to return to the negotiating table are perceived by hawks as interference.
Will Delhi put pressure on Colombo to back off when troops reach Kilinochchi town? While some Sri Lankan analysts are drawing parallels with the 1987 scenario, this is unlikely.
Much has changed in India's relations with the LTTE since the summer of 1987. The LTTE was designated a terrorist outfit by India in 1992, its leader Velupillai Prabhakaran is wanted for his role in the assassination of former prime minister Rajiv Gandhi. In 1995, India did not intervene when the Sri Lankan army wrested control of the Jaffna Peninsula from the LTTE.
In the past few years, India's military and economic cooperation with the Sri Lankan government has grown significantly. It is supplying the Lankan armed forces with non-lethal military hardware, backing their operations with naval surveillance of the waters off its coast and providing key intelligence input. It is reported to be virtually throwing open the doors of its different military institutions to train Sri Lankan armed forces in counter-insurgency operations and is said to be offering them specialized naval courses in gunnery, navigation, communication and anti-submarine warfare. These have helped in no small measure in the weakening of the LTTE over the past couple of years.
The LTTE is likely to put up a fierce fight to defend Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu - the last two districts under its control. It is said to be prepared to sacrifice several thousand fighters to defend these strongholds.
Sri Lankan hawks have been wondering whether India will intervene to prevent the fall of Kilinochchi into the government's hands. The question they should be asking is whether India will go to Colombo's rescue in the event of the LTTE inflicting very heavy casualties on the Sri Lankan armed forces in the battle for Kilinochchi, before retreating to the jungles.
Sudha Ramachandran is an independent journalist/researcher based in Bangalore.
Source
Comments